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PROTECTION AGAINST SLAVERY IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
Katja Heesterman* 
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in CN v The United Kingdom highlighted that 
slavery remains a modern problem. It may no longer resemble the traditional picture of slavery 
dramatically presented by Hollywood but it is no less an issue. Modern slavery is less visible; it is 
hidden away within homes, normal workplaces or in overseas factories. This article argues that 
New Zealand's current treatment of slavery is inadequate, exemplified by the absence of 
prosecutions. Thorough protection of slavery requires clear definitions that courts can easily apply. 
This article explores how the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 could be used to remedy this 
situation. This article argues for the application of the Drittwirkung concept to give a horizontal 
effect to a right against slavery. Furthermore it is argued that New Zealand is under positive 
obligations to actively prevent rights violations, not merely avoid them. These positive obligations 
are a key component of modern human rights jurisprudence and can be read into the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. This article speculates that one action courts could take is to undertake the 
development of a tort action against slavery. 
I INTRODUCTION 
You may choose to look the other way but you can never again say that you did not know. – William 
Wilberforce1 
Slavery is often characterised by images of slaves traipsing their chained and bleeding feet onto 
America-bound ships, towards the marketplace for sale; towards plantations to be worked until 
death.2 Many see Wilberforce's abolition of slavery in the 1800s as a triumph of humanity over 
barbarity. Yet slavery is not merely a historic atrocity. It is a present reality for over 35 million 
people worldwide.3 Once shipped across the Atlantic, slaves are now trafficked throughout the 
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1  Walk Free Foundation The Global Slavery Index 2014 (2014) at 4. 
2  Anti-Slavery International "What is Modern Slavery?" <www.antislavery.org>. 
3  Walk Free Foundation, above n 1, at 5. 
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world. Once trapped by chains, they are now hidden in basements and overseas factories. Once 
openly justified through science and religion, slavery is now implicitly condoned by consumer 
choices and insatiable demand for cheaper products. 
World Cups, Olympic and Commonwealth Games have provoked controversy over the working 
conditions of those constructing the tournament infrastructure.4 Pressure is currently on Qatar to 
improve the labour standards of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in advance of the 2022 
FIFA World Cup.5 The clothing industry is similarly concerning. In 2013 a Bangladeshi factory 
supplying Western brands collapsed, killing 1,100 workers who had been forced to enter the 
building despite safety concerns.6 
Although New Zealand is far better than countries such as India, which has an estimated 14 
million enslaved people, New Zealand is no safe haven. At the time of writing there were 
approximately 600 people trapped in slavery situations in New Zealand.7 This exceeds both the 
average annual road toll (300),8 and the homicide rate (80);9 issues which receive considerable 
media attention and government investment in preventative efforts. Yet slavery, occurring at a 
comparable frequency, is the subject of far less discussion and focused action. Specific problem 
areas are foreign vessels fishing in New Zealand waters, and the construction, agriculture, restaurant 
and prostitution industries.10 Many women willingly enter New Zealand to work in the sex industry 
and are subsequently forced into exploitative situations.11 Especially concerning is the internal 
trafficking of underage girls for commercial sexual exploitation.12 Christchurch's booming 
construction industry has fuelled exploitative migrant recruitment practices.13 Recruited workers 
  
4  John Ray "China's disabled children are sold into slavery as beggars" (22 July 2007) The Guardian 
<www.theguardian.com>; "Delhi's Commonwealth Games slave labour shame" (2 February 2010) Herald 
Sun <www.heraldsun.com.au>. 
5  Dave Zirin "Slave Labour? Mass Prisons? FIFA Mangles the World Cup and the Beautiful Game" (26 
September 2013) The Nation <www.thenation.com>. 
6  Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights "Factory Collapse in Bangladesh" (24 April 2014) 
<www.globallabourrights.org>. 
7  Walk Free Foundation, above n 1, at 20–21. 
8  New Zealand Transport Agency "Road death statistics" (10 June 2014) <www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
9  Police National Headquarters NZ Crime Statistics: A Summary of Recorded and Resolved Offence Statistics 
(2014) at 2. 
10  Walk Free Foundation Global Slavery Index 2013 (2013) at 91; and United States Department of State 
Trafficking in Persons Report (2014) at 291. 
11  United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report (2009) at 222. 
12  United States Department of State, above n 10, at 291. 
13  See Michael Morrah "Christchurch rebuild migrants face debts, cramped accommodation" (16 July 2014) 3 
News <www.3news.co.nz>. 
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have their original contracts replaced upon arrival, their identity documents confiscated, substantial 
debts incurred against them and are crammed into degrading living conditions.14 
New Zealand's admirable human rights record does not afford room for complacency.  This 
article argues that New Zealand needs to improve its current legal protections against slavery. It 
needs to ensure that the laws addressing slavery communicate clearly and prohibit explicitly the 
harm central to slavery, ownership of another human. This issue was addressed in respect of the 
United Kingdom in CN v The United Kingdom (CN v UK).15 This case affirmed the inadequacy of 
the United Kingdom's slavery legislation. More significantly however, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) found that such an inadequacy constituted a breach of the United 
Kingdom's obligations under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).16 This article suggests that not only are New Zealand's legal measures against 
slavery inadequate, but furthermore that that inadequacy is a breach of New Zealand's international 
obligations to prevent slavery. It will explore how the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of 
Rights) can be used to improve those protections and so satisfy New Zealand's obligations regarding 
slavery. 
II A DEFINITION OF SLAVERY 
Slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour are closely related offences that are often 
prohibited and prosecuted together.17 Slavery is "the status or condition of a person over whom any 
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised".18 The Australian High Court 
found that these powers include: making a person an object of purchase; using a person and his or 
her labour in a substantially unrestricted manner; an entitlement to the fruits of a person's labour 
without commensurate compensation; and controlling and restricting a person's movement.19 
Servitude is "an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to 
be linked with the concept of 'slavery'".20 Forced or compulsory labour is "all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
  
14  Steph Lambert Protecting the Vulnerable (Justice Acts New Zealand, 2014) at 14. 
15  CN v The United Kingdom (2013) 56 EHRR 24 (Section IV, ECHR). 
16  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222 (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR]. 
17  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (signed 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR], art 8; and ECHR, above n 16, art 4. 
18  Slavery Convention 182 UNTS 51 (signed 25 September 1926, entered into force 9 March 1927), art 1 
(emphasis added). 
19  R v Tang [2008] HCA 39, (2008) 237 CLR 1 at [26]. 
20  Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16 (Section II, ECHR) at [124]. 
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offered himself voluntarily".21 These three offences represent varying grades of severity but can 
occur simultaneously.22 Delineating the precise borders between these three offences is beyond the 
scope of this article. For ease of purpose, "slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour" will 
hereinafter be referred to as "slavery" unless otherwise indicated. 
In recent years it has been suggested that human trafficking for exploitation is also a related 
concept. Trafficking consists of three elements: (a) an action facilitating migration; (b) committed 
by certain means; (c) for the purpose of exploitation. Trafficking's core concern with the movement 
of individuals renders it primarily an immigration issue. Whilst slavery can be a purpose of human 
trafficking, slavery and trafficking are not synonymous.23 It is unclear to what extent trafficking 
should fall within international slavery provisions.24 Failing to differentiate between them could 
result in slavery being overlooked, as occurred in CN v UK.25 Trafficking must be treated as 
distinct. 
States are rarely directly responsible for slavery – it is largely a private and secret enterprise 
which states struggle to identify, let alone prevent. There are numerous different forms of modern 
slavery involving relationships from the obviously exploitative to more subtle, complicated, fear-
based dependencies.26 It is important to distinguish between slavery and poor employment 
situations.27 Late payment of wages, no holiday pay, non-guaranteed hours, and poor health and 
safety conditions are examples of substandard employment environments.28 However, the 
temptation to announce these sorts of employment law breaches as slavery must be avoided. The 
severity of true slavery situations, involving ownership of another human, must not be thus 
diminished. 
  
21  Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 39 UNTS 55 (signed 28 June 1930, entered into 
force 1 May 1932), art 2(1). 
22  Vladislava Stoyanova "Dancing On the Borders of Article 4: Human Trafficking and the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Ranstev Case" (2012) 30 NQHR 163 at 181 and 182. 
23  At 169–170 and 177. 
24  At 164. 
25  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 15, at [80]. 
26  Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd ed, NP Engel, 
Germany, 2005) at 195–196; and Walk Free Foundation, above n 1, at 10–11. 
27  International Labour Organization The cost of coercion: Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Report I(B), 98th Session, 2009) at [23]. 
28  Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain and Paul Spoonley Temporary migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A literature 
review (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, March 2014) at 9. 
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III CN v THE UNITED KINGDOM 
This case demonstrates that, although abolished, slavery remains inadequately addressed, even 
in developed countries. Particularly, it illustrates how deficiencies in legislation can leave slavery 
victims without remedy. Furthermore it is an example of positive obligations being imposed on a 
state regarding slavery. 
A Facts 
The applicant was willingly smuggled into the United Kingdom in 2002. Upon her arrival her 
vulnerability, isolation and fear were exploited by her captors to create dependency. She was sent to 
an elderly Iraqi couple where she worked for four years as a live-in carer. The majority of the 
International Labour Organization's (ILO) forced labour indicators were present in her situation. The 
indicators are:  
(a)  abuse of vulnerability;  
(b)  deception;  
(c)  restriction of movement;  
(d)  isolation;  
(e)  physical and sexual violence;  
(f)  intimidation and threats;  
(g)  retention of identity documents;  
(h)  withholding of wages;  
(i)  debt bondage;  
(j)  abusive working and living conditions; and  
(k)  excessive overtime.29  
The applicant was a victim of indicators (a), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k).30 In August 2006 she 
managed to alert police. Throughout the investigation the authorities focused on trafficking 
offences.31 A police unit specialising in trafficking ran the investigation. English law at the time 
only prohibited domestic servitude where trafficking had occurred.32 That offence was consequently 
not applicable because she had immigrated willingly. Her solicitor requested investigation into other 
offences. However, the police concluded that there was no evidence of trafficking for exploitation 
even though slavery and forced labour were supposedly under investigation. They said there were 
  
29  International Labour Office ILO indicators of Forced Labour (International Labour Organization: Special 
Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, October 2012) at 3. 
30  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 15, at [20]. 
31  At [76]. 
32  At [29].  See Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (UK), s 4. 
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no offences in English law that applied to her situation and she was left without a remedy.33 In 
January 2008 the applicant lodged an application against the United Kingdom with the ECtHR.34 In 
2009 the United Kingdom made slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour offences in 
accordance with the ECHR.35 
B Submissions 
The applicant claimed the United Kingdom was positively obligated to criminalise domestic 
servitude. It had breached that obligation by only criminalising conduct peripheral to domestic 
servitude. She argued that her treatment was consistent with that in Siliadin v France (Siliadin).36 
Consequently the positive obligation to criminalise the specific conduct of the ECHR should be 
affirmed.37 She alleged that the police were ignorant of relevant factors regarding domestic 
servitude. Furthermore the lack of domestic law provisions at the time prevented effective 
investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators.38 The United Kingdom argued firstly that the 
investigation was not terminated because of an absence of applicable criminal offences. Rather there 
was insufficient evidence that she was a victim of domestic servitude.39 Secondly, it argued that 
criminalising aspects of slavery in various independent sections adequately satisfied the positive 
obligations.40 
C Decision 
The ECtHR came to three key conclusions. Firstly, the applicant's situation aroused credible 
suspicion that she had been a victim of domestic servitude. Article 4 of the ECHR imposes specific 
positive obligations on member states to penalise and prosecute slavery. These involve operational 
measures to protect victims and procedural obligations to investigate suspected violations when the 
member state is aware of the risk of violation.41 The Government’s credible suspicion of the 
violation against the applicant thus obligated it to investigate.42 Secondly, the United Kingdom's 
legislation provided insufficient protection against the art 4 conduct. As in Siliadin, the relevant 
  
33  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 15, at [16] and [29]. 
34  At [1]. 
35  At [31]; and Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 71. 
36  Siliadin v France, above n 20. 
37  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 15, at [42], [48] and [51]. 
38  At [49]–[50]. 
39  At [54]. 
40  At [56]. 
41  At [66], [67] and [69]. 
42  At [70]–[72]. 
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legislation was "not sufficiently specific" and "too restrictive". The Court pointed to the increasingly 
high standard of rights protection expected internationally. Accordingly there is a need to 
specifically criminalise domestic servitude, not just associated behaviours.43 Thirdly, the Court 
confirmed that the failure to pay attention to the complex factors of domestic servitude was due to 
the legislation's trafficking focus. The provision of an inadequate investigation violated art 4.44 
IV NEW ZEALAND'S LEGAL SITUATION 
Akin to the former United Kingdom position, New Zealand's legal framework and remedies 
provide insufficient protection against slavery. First, note that there are several common 
misconceptions surrounding protections against slavery which do not in fact provide such 
protection. Contrary to popular belief, habeas corpus does not provide protection against slavery in 
New Zealand despite the decision in Somerset v Stewart. Somerset v Stewart did not free all slaves; 
it stood only for the rule that no slave could be forcibly removed from England.45 In addition, while 
the International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 prohibits "enslavement", it does 
not apply to isolated incidents of slavery so does not address the conduct at issue in this article.46  
A Criminal Law 
Criminalisation is required to address slavery. Unfortunately, most slavery legislation 
worldwide is poorly enforced and New Zealand is no exception.47 In New Zealand, slavery and 
forced labour are criminalised in ss 98 and 98AA of the Crimes Act 1961 with maximum sentences 
of 14 years. These provisions are independent of the trafficking offences. 
Section 98(2) defines a slave as including, "without limitation, a person subject to debt-bondage 
or serfdom". Serfdom is further defined as: 
the status or condition of a tenant who is by any law, custom, or agreement bound to live and labour on 
land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to that other person, whether 
for reward or not, and who is not free to change that status or condition. 
  
43  At [75]–[76]. See Siliadin v France, above n 20, at [142]. See generally Recommendation 1523 (2001) of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at [9]. 
44  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 15, at [80]–[82]. 
45  Somerset v Stewart (1722) 98 ER 499. See Paul D Halliday Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2010) at 175. 
46  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 90 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002), art 7(1) and (2), sch to the International Crimes and International Criminal 
Court Act 2000. 
47  Walk Free Foundation, above n 10, at 10. 
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Debt-Bondage is defined as:48 
the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his or her personal services, or of the 
personal services of any person under his or her control, as security for a debt, if the value of those 
services, as reasonably assessed, is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or if the length and 
nature of those services are not limited and defined. 
While this definition of slavery is framed to allow flexibility, it does not encapsulate the "right 
of ownership" central to international definitions of slavery.49 It also has been framed to include 
servitude. The definition of serfdom in s 98(2) bears close resemblance to the ECtHR's definition of 
servitude.50 As discussed above, slavery and servitude are related but correspond to different levels 
of severity.51 Their amalgamation thus reveals a limited understanding of the nature and 
circumstances giving rise to each of them. If courts read this provision down towards servitude it 
could diminish the perceived gravity of the offence. Alternatively, if courts read this provision up 
towards slavery, servitude-type situations that do not meet the threshold for slavery may slip 
through the cracks. Both situations impair the effectiveness of any protection offered. 
Section 98AA prohibits sexual exploitation, removal of body parts and forced labour. Whilst 
sexual exploitation is defined extensively, forced labour is not at all.52 This is partly explained by s 
98AA having been introduced to comply with a children's rights convention.53 The inclusion of 
forced labour was merely incidental to the primary concern – protecting children from sexual 
exploitation. The protection offered against forced labour is thus less comprehensive than it ought to 
be. 
Action against slavery is currently inhibited by the lack of prosecutions. This is due in part to a 
lack of understanding of the nature of enslavement itself attributable to the deficient definitions 
described above.54 For example, in 2001, 15 smuggled Thai women were forced into prostitution 
and their earnings were confiscated to repay imposed debts. The culprits were never convicted 
because the police believed the absence of physical restraints meant the case would likely fail. Yet a 
  
48  Crimes Act 1961, s 98(2). 
49  Slavery Convention, above n 18, art 1; and Siliadin v France, above n 20, at [122]. 
50  See Siliadin v France, above n 20, at [123]; and Crimes Act 1961, s 98(2). 
51  International Labour Organization, above n 27, at [43]. 
52  Crimes Act 1961, s 98AA(3)–(6). 
53  (2 March 2004) 615 NZPD 11472; and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 2171 UNTS 227 (opened for signature 25 
May 2000, entered into force 18 January 2002). 
54  United States Department of State, above n 10, at 292. 
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number of the forced labour indicators were present.55 There is some evidence that courts have been 
choosing to prosecute under employment or immigration provisions rather than under ss 98 and 
98AA.56 To improve the investigative processes and secure more convictions for slavery offences, 
greater knowledge of slavery is necessary. A clearer definition of slavery and greater judicial 
awareness of the aforementioned indicators would help courts to know when and how to apply ss 98 
and 98AA. 
One successful prosecution under s 98 involved a man being convicted of selling a woman as a 
slave.57 He had assisted her entry into the country and lived off her earnings before offering to sell 
her to an undercover police officer. He was found guilty under s 98(1)(a) and (j) and sentenced to 
five years imprisonment followed by deportation.58 The Court of Appeal said accepted the trial 
Judge's definition that slavery is submission to domination where domination means "control and 
authority that brooks no opposition or disobedience".59 There was no reference to ownership. 
However, in awarding the sentence, the trial Judge had equated the accused's behaviour with rape 
and had emphasised the need to deter others from acting similarly.60 This was recognition of the 
seriousness of slavery which should be emulated in other cases. The approach could have been 
further improved through reference to the concept of ownership. 
B Tort Law 
There are a number of civil actions that could provide some protection to victims of slavery. 
These include the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, deceit and mental injury. Assault's 
requirement that there be an intentional act causing apprehension of physical contact, and battery's 
requirement of an intentional act of contact with the plaintiff's body, will often be satisfied in 
slavery incidents. False imprisonment requires the "total deprivation of liberty" of the plaintiff. This 
can include psychological imprisonment achieved through threats or assertions of authority.61 The 
  
55  Susan Glazebrook, Justice of the New Zealand Court of Appeal "Human Trafficking and New Zealand" 
(keynote address to AGM of the New Zealand Women Judges Association, Auckland, 13 August 2010) at 
9; and International Labour Office, above n 29, at 3. 
56  Thomas Harré "Human trafficking in New Zealand: a review of recent case law" NZ Lawyer (New Zealand, 
17 January 2014). See generally Elliott (Labour Inspector) v Kirk ET Auckland AET581/00, 19 February 
2001; and R v Rahimi CA4/02, 30 April 2002. 
57  R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 (CA). 
58  At 142. 
59  At 144. 
60  At 148. 
61  Pam Stewart "Tortious Remedies for Deliberate Wrongdoing to Victims of Human Trafficking and Slavery 
in Australia" (2011) 34 UNSWLJ 898 at 908–911; and Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand 
(6th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2013) at [4.5.01]. 
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tort of deceit is primarily applicable in commercial situations so would need some extension before 
it could be properly useful in slavery situations. Action for mental injury is generally available in 
New Zealand.62 However, work-related mental injury and mental injury caused by sexual offences 
are covered by the Accident Compensation Act 2001.63 To the extent that slavery situations are 
considered "employment", a tort action for mental injury is thus unavailable.  
Whilst these torts may be applicable in some slavery situations there are several issues. First, not 
all slavery situations will be covered by all of these torts. This could lead to inconsistent treatment 
of slavery in the courts and victims receiving different remedies. Secondly, whilst these torts indeed 
provide some remedy for victims, they do not address the issue at the heart of slavery. There is a 
difference between an assault in a bar fight and being threatened during enslavement. Slavery is one 
of the most serious violations of human rights, involving ownership of another human being. The 
severity of this sort of behaviour should not be diminished by association with lesser wrongdoing. 
Consequently, the current tort actions do not provide sufficient protection against slavery. 
C Other Measures 
It should be noted that although New Zealand has extensive employment regulations there are 
nonetheless some types of workers unprotected by that regime. These can include contractors, 
triangle employment arrangements, illegal workers and migrant workers.64 The Government has 
taken steps towards monitoring high risk industries.65 However, New Zealand does not have a law 
enforcement unit specifically trained to identify, prevent, monitor and address modern slavery 
situations.66 There needs to be further investigation into how the basic employment rights given to 
employees can be extended to all workers.67 
D In Summary 
The lack of clear, delineated and internationally consistent definitions of slavery in New 
Zealand's legislation inhibits effective prosecution of slavery. So too does the absence of a specific 
tort action concerning enslavement. Whether New Zealand is obligated to remedy this will be 
discussed below. 
  
62  Todd, above n 61, at [5.7]. 
63  Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 21 and 21B. 
64  Lambert, above n 14, at 24. 
65  United States Department of State, above n 10, at 292. 
66  Walk Free Foundation, above n 10, at 92. 
67  See Lambert, above n 14, at 24 and 32 for more information. 
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V A BILL OF RIGHTS INTERPRETATION 
This article now considers whether the Bill of Rights can be used to interpret the Crimes Act 
sections in a way that extends the protection provided. 
A Slavery and the Bill of Rights 
Slavery is not referred to in the Bill of Rights. Given that slavery is primarily committed by 
private individuals, it can be classified as a horizontal right.68 However, the Bill of Rights 
supposedly applies to vertical rights where there is state action satisfying s 3.69 Furthermore, the Bill 
of Rights focuses more on procedural rights than substantive rights.70 However, with the doctrine of 
positive obligations, discussed below, the exclusion of slavery on that basis should be considered 
flawed – judicial action in private slavery cases would have to comply. 
Constitutional provisions often provoke the development of other laws, serve an educative 
function and filter new law. This on its own does not satisfy positive obligations. Despite the United 
Kingdom's constitutional protections against slavery, it still breached its positive obligations in CN v 
UK.71 The ECtHR focused more on practical operational measures to protect victims.72 The absence 
of a constitutional provision weakens the protections offered against slavery, however that absence 
does not necessarily correlate with a breach of New Zealand's positive obligations.  
The absence of slavery in the Bill of Rights could be ameliorated by reading it in. This does not 
give slavery the prominence and protection it would have received through express inclusion in the 
Bill of Rights but it is an improvement on the present situation. The Bill of Rights must be read 
generously and in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).73 Some 
academics consider that the ICCPR cannot be used to fill gaps in the Bill of Rights deliberately left 
by Parliament.74 However, the treatment of privacy indicates that where the ICCPR has not been 
transposed, missing rights may be read in to provide at least some protection.75 In both Hosking v 
Runting (Hosking) and C v Holland, the Court read privacy into the right against unreasonable 
  
68  See Part II: A Definition of Slavery, above; and Nowak, above n 26, at 39 and 195. 
69  Geoffrey Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984–1985] I AJHR A6 at [10.12] 
and [10.16]. 
70  (10 October 1989) 5502 NZPD 13040. 
71  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), sch 1. 
72  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 15, at [67]. 
73  ICCPR, above n 17. See Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights: a commentary 
(LexisNexis, New Zealand, 2005) at [4.2.3]–[4.2.5]. 
74  At [4.5.11]. 
75  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 28. 
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search and seizure.76 Privacy was an existing legal value and its absence from the Bill of Rights did 
not constitute its "legislative rejection".77 However, it was found that unless Parliament explicitly 
restricts development in a particular area, courts can consider themselves free to develop the 
common law.78 Courts may even be obligated to do so where international values have been ratified 
by New Zealand.79 
The right into which slavery can best be read is most likely the right not to be subjected to 
torture or cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment.80 In Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia, 
the ECtHR addressed the torture and slavery allegations together because of their similarities.81 
Furthermore, the word treatment has been read as applying to all behaviour inconsistent with human 
dignity and value, not just criminal justice and disciplinary processes.82 Slavery is certainly 
inconsistent with human dignity and value. Other rights such as freedom of movement, the right to 
liberty and the right to justice are too narrow themselves to allow slavery to be read in.83 However, 
under a schematic approach to the Bill of Rights these rights support the argument for reading 
slavery into torture.84  
B Section 6 Analysis 
Section 6 requires the preference of a Bill of Rights-consistent meaning of an enactment. 
Parliament should specify if it does not intend to affirm the Bill of Rights.85 However, courts 
"cannot rewrite or legislate".86 The phrase "includes, without limitation" means slavery could be 
read widely to include behaviour other than debt bondage or serfdom. This would certainly be more 
consistent with the Bill of Rights than restricting the scope to only those two behaviours. However, 
the goal of applying s 6 to s 98 of the Crimes Act is to read the definition of slave widely enough to 
  
76  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at [60]; C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at 
[25]. 
77  Hosking v Runting, above n 76, at [92]; and C v Holland, above n 76, at [28]–[31]. 
78  Hosking v Runting, above n 76, at [228] per Tipping J; and C v Holland, above n 76, at [81]. 
79  C v Holland, above n 76, at [69]. 
80  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
81  Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1 (Section I, ECHR) at [252]. 
82  Butler and Butler, above n 73, at [10.1.4], [10.3.1] and [10.9.1]. 
83  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 18, 22 and 27. 
84  See the discussion in Part VI(B)(2)(d) of this article about the values approach used in Germany and India 
for insight into this approach. 
85  Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) at 287 per Hardie Boys J. 
86  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) at 572 per Tipping J. 
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incorporate the idea of ownership inherent in other definitions of slavery. Exercising ownership over 
another human being is a severe action. Reading that concept into s 98 is not something the courts 
should do absent a legislative mandate. Furthermore, a whole separate offence of servitude could 
not be added in merely through a s 6 analysis. 
Regarding s 98AA, a meaning of forced labour consistent with the Bill of Rights could be found 
by using the definition contained in Part II of this article. However, the other two behaviours in s 
98AA are sexual exploitation and removal of body parts. To read forced labour as referring to "all 
work or service" extracted involuntarily and under threats is to introduce a very different and quite 
substantial concept into the section. It does not fit well. 
Reading ss 98 and 98AA consistently with the Bill of Rights certainly improves the situation. 
However, it still does not provide the comprehensive protection against slavery that is necessary. 
This can be illustrated by a comparison with the Australian legislation. The Australian Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) slavery provisions are internationally regarded as well-crafted with clear 
definitions and distinctions between behaviours.87 Slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory 
labour are separately defined and prohibited using wording consistent with international 
definitions.88 Even a wide interpretation of the Crimes Act could not achieve the precise and 
comprehensive protection offered by the Australian Act. 
VI ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
To the extent that the Bill of Rights is unable to remedy the defects in the Crimes Act, there are 
two alternative ways the Bill of Rights can provide protection against slavery. First, Drittwirkung is 
a concept by which human rights can be invoked in the private sphere because they have a 
horizontal effect as well as a vertical one. It refers to the effect of human rights between private 
parties.89 Courts must interpret and apply the law between private parties consistently with human 
rights.90 Secondly, this article will explore the obligations on states to take measures to protect 
human rights against private violation. New Zealand is under positive obligations to protect against 
slavery. This means that New Zealand must actively prevent slavery occurring within its jurisdiction 
even when committed by private individuals. 
  
87  Vladislava Stoyonava "Article 4 of the ECHR and the Obligation of Criminalising Slavery, Servitude, 
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking" (2014) 3 CJICL 407 at 441. 
88  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 270–271. 
89  BVerfGE, 7, 198 I. Senate (1 BvR 400/51) [Lüth]; and Nowak, above n 26, at 39. 
90  Chava Schwebel "Welfare Rights in Canadian and German Constitutional Law" (2011) 12 GLJ 1902 at 
1926; and Lüth, above n 89. 
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A Drittwirkung 
Protecting against slavery, a predominantly horizontal right, requires more than mere state non-
action.91 Modern slavery is undertaken primarily by private parties, so for protection to be effective 
it must be broad enough to cover those private parties. However, citizens cannot ordinarily invoke 
the Bill of Rights against one another.92 Nonetheless, the Bill of Rights can apply in the private 
sphere through the application of the Drittwirkung concept. Its implication is that courts, when they 
apply both legislation and the common law, can extend those private relationships in order to protect 
the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.  
The key objection to this is that s 3 of the Bill of Rights limits its application to state and public 
functions. It is argued that the Bill of Rights cannot reach into areas of life where personal 
autonomy is unaffected by the state.93 However, most private conduct is regulated by law and to 
that extent is public.94 Therefore the public bodies that create and monitor those private laws must, 
as they do so, apply the Bill of Rights.95 This requires more than the mere compliance of procedural 
rules; the substantive outcomes of those processes must involve an application of the Bill of Rights 
also. Rights thus do affect the "structuring of relationships under private law".96 A private individual 
claiming under existing legislation or common law is able to "demand a Bill of Rights consistent 
judicial determination".97  
The real controversy arises when giving effect to the Bill of Rights would require the courts to 
significantly alter existing causes of action or to create new ones entirely.98 For instance, a slavery 
victim might sue for assault but fail to prove the requisite elements. Despite this, the courts, 
recalling that slavery can be read into the Bill of Rights, might determine that to protect the victim 
adequately and give effect to the Bill of Rights in this context, the development of a tort of slavery 
is necessary. Similarly, where statutes contain ambiguous terms, Drittwirkung works to allow courts 
  
91  Nowak, above n 26, at 196. 
92  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3. 
93  Murray Hunt "Human Rights Review and the Public–Private Distinction" in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, 
Portland, 2002) 3 at 77. 
94  Andrew Clapham (ed) Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993) at 94 
and 131–132. 
95  Jan Stemplewitz "Horizontal rights and freedoms: an analysis of the role and effect of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 in private litigation" (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005) at 
6 and 9. 
96  Nowak, above n 26, at 39. 
97  Stemplewitz, above n 95, at 14. 
98  At 17 and 25. 
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to expand rights protections.99 Given the above s 6 analysis of the Crimes Act, the common law 
application of Drittwirkung is more useful with regard to slavery. 
Some support for this private sphere application of human rights can be found in the New 
Zealand case law.100 Unlike Blanchard J, who was reluctant to apply the Bill of Rights to the 
substance of the judiciary's judgments,101 later cases have not been so conservative.102 In Lange v 
Atkinson, Elias J distinguished the Canadian approach because the Canadian Charter does not refer 
to judicial acts as does New Zealand's Bill of Rights. She said that "[i]t is idle to suggest that the 
common law need not conform to the judgments in such legislation."103 The Canadian approach was 
enunciated in a libel case between private parties. The Court said that without state attributable acts 
Charter rights are not actionable.104 In private cases the common law must be applied consistently 
with the Charter, however it cannot be revised and supplemented in the way discussed above merely 
to give effect to the Charter.105 Paul Rishworth would have New Zealand adhere to the Canadian 
approach, characterising the Bill of Rights merely as a limitation on state action.106 
Nonetheless, in both Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand and Duff v Communicado (Duff) 
the Bill of Rights was applied "to acts done by the judicial branch of the Government".107 In fact, 
the High Court in Duff explicitly indicated that this finding applied generally to the common law.108 
Tipping J in Hosking said that whilst the Bill of Rights regulates the relationship between the state 
and its citizens:109 
[I]t will often be appropriate for the values which are recognised in that context to inform the 
development of the common law in its function of regulating relationships between citizen and citizen. 
  
99  Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) [Baigent's Case] at 676; and see Butler and Butler, 
above n 73, at [5.6.6]–[5.6.8]. 
100  Butler and Butler, above n 73, at [5.8.10]. 
101  Television New Zealand Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91 (HC) at 96. 
102  Hunt, above n 93, at 75. 
103  Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) at 32. 
104  Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at [82]. 
105  At [95]. See also Dolphin Delivery Ltd v Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 [1986] 
2 SCR 573. 
106 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 102–
108; and Hunt, above n 93, at 77. 
107  Solicitor-General v Radio NZ Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48 (HC) at 58. 
108  Duff v Communicado Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 89 (HC) at 99. 
109  Hosking v Runting, above n 76, at [229] per Tipping J. 
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Consequently when courts apply substantive law to private situations they must give effect to 
the Bill of Rights. Thus, when slavery arises before the courts, the courts would be obligated to use 
the Bill of Rights to remedy the current deficient protections and address the behaviours at the core 
of slavery. 
B Positive Obligations 
Arguably the common law cannot be fully subject to the Bill of Rights unless there are positive 
obligations upon the state. The ultimate effect of these would be that New Zealand is obligated to 
remedy the current slavery protections even though it concerns acts between private parties.110 This 
could be done in a variety of ways from the courts developing new causes of action to Parliament 
amending old or introducing new legislation. 
1 Doctrine of positive obligations 
Historically human rights were concerned with preventing state action, not requiring it.111 
Recently the language of human rights instruments has suggested something more: positive 
obligations. States are obligated to exercise due diligence to prevent and remedy human rights 
violations. Failure to do so results in state liability even when the actual violation was committed by 
a non-state actor.112 States are not responsible for every human rights abuse incident.113 The distinct 
injuries occurring must be fairly attributed between the non-state actor and the state. For instance, an 
act of torture produces individual culpability, but the failure to sufficiently deter or subsequently 
prosecute produces state culpability.  The responsibility under due diligence is to avoid the state-
attributable harm. This approach is advocated by the non-repression theory which has been favoured 
by some over the "'presumed complicity' theory of state responsibility". The latter requires states to 
have some knowledge or a credible suspicion of the threat of a right being violated.114 For slavery 
this is impractical because, as demonstrated in CN v UK, slavery is often too well hidden for threats 
to come easily to the attention of the government. 
Positive obligations are a combination of express textual requirements and "implied judicial 
creations".115 A number of articles in the ICCPR and the ECHR, such as slavery and propaganda for 
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115  Alastair Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2004) at 2 and 44. 
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war, contain express positive obligations.116 The application of these is not controversial, but their 
scope is the subject of much jurisprudence.117 States are given a wide margin of appreciation with 
criminal provisions only being required in the most severe circumstances.118 
The ECtHR has also implied positive obligations into other articles. Respecting rights means 
avoiding violating them. However, the general requirement to protect, ensure and fulfil rights gives 
rise to the further obligation of guaranteeing them for others.119 The Court often combines a general 
provision with a substantive provision to create a positive obligation.120 It uses the principle of 
effectiveness to give provisions "the fullest weight and effect consistent with the language used and 
with the rest of the text" and to determine the scope of obligations.121 The Court's goal in 
interpreting the ECHR should be promoting human rights not limiting state responsibility.122 The 
Court has consequently implied positive obligations in otherwise negatively framed rights.  
It is into the determination of scope of obligations that the margin of appreciation becomes 
important.123 Positive obligations have made even further inroads into state sovereignty than human 
rights in general.124 Governments may be compelled by an external party to take domestic actions.  
The ECtHR wishes to protect the sovereignty of states by not legislating for them, especially 
regarding more controversial issues.125 Consequently, states may often choose which measures they 
will undertake to meet their positive obligations.126 Defective legal regimes, lack of procedural 
safeguards and issues regarding important aspects of individual existence tend to result in narrower 
margins. Political controversy and lack of international consensus result in wider margins. For 
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instance, there tends to be less uniformity across regarding economic, social and environmental 
issues.127 
2 New Zealand's positive obligations 
This section explores the reasoning behind imposing positive obligations on New Zealand. This 
is done through looking at domestic cases, Human Rights Committee (HRC) and ECtHR 
jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of other states and policy reasons. The consequence of these 
obligations is that New Zealand is obligated to provide better protection against slavery than 
currently exists. 
(a) New Zealand cases 
Few New Zealand courts have engaged in discussions about positive obligations and certainly 
none in regard to slavery. Where the issue of positive obligations has arisen, courts have tended to 
focus very narrowly on the facts, refusing to make a general statement of the law. The following 
five cases indicate the general approach taken towards positive obligations. 
Sharma v ANZ Banking Group concerned freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. 
Bailiffs had failed to discriminate between the appellant's property and his wife's property.128 Whilst 
his claims regarding the bailiffs' behaviour failed, it was suggested that, had he and his wife 
combined their claim, a new cause of action may have arisen from the Bill of Rights despite being a 
private situation.129 In Mendelssohn v Attorney-General, the Court of Appeal said that in that case 
freedom of religion was a negative freedom so no positive action was expected of the state to protect 
it.130 However, the Court also said that some parts of the Bill of Rights do expressly impose positive 
obligations. Additionally, in some circumstances, positive obligations may arise out of negative 
rights.131  
In Shortland v Northland Health Ltd, the Court of Appeal said the right to life did not obligate 
the state to provide expensive medical treatment to a man with kidney failure.132 Whilst New 
Zealand courts have not yet explored the full extent of the state's obligation to protect life, this case 
  
127 Jana Gajdošová "Article 8 ECHR and Its Impact on English Law" (PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia 
Law School, 2008) at 157–158 and 202.  
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Rights on Medical Law" (paper published for One Crown Office Row, United Kingdom, October 2002). 
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indicates that the scope of obligations will be limited in some circumstances.133 Clark v Governor-
General concerned positive obligations regarding torture.134 The plaintiff argued ss 9 and 23(5) of 
the Bill of Rights had been breached by the Government's failure to provide education, investigate 
allegations, review processes and protect against torture.135 The Government contended that no such 
obligations were expressly or impliedly included in those sections.136 The Judge held that the 
incorporation of those obligations depended on their justiciability.137 Education and reviews were 
non-justiciable because they were too political an issue. Impartial investigation and protection of 
claimants were justiciable because they are essential to the right against torture.138 However, on 
these facts the latter actions had been carried out by the Government so a final decision on 
incorporation of positive obligations was unnecessary.139 
One Bill of Rights draft authorised courts to grant remedies in situations where no adequate 
remedy presently existed.140 Despite this being absent from the final version, courts have 
nonetheless developed remedies. In Simpson v Attorney-General, McKay J questioned how "rights 
can be protected and promoted if they are merely affirmed, but there is no remedy for their breach, 
and no other legal consequence".141 Courts' willingness to develop remedies in this way indicates 
their desire to protect and promote rights. Some gaps in the Bill of Rights have been interpreted as 
Parliament delegating authority to the judiciary to explore those areas themselves.142 
In summary, the judiciary has indicated a willingness to develop the common law beyond what 
is specifically articulated in the Bill of Rights even in regard to rights that are framed negatively.143 
This is dependent on the justiciability of the specific obligation and its extent is subject to some 
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limitations. Courts are concerned with protecting rights and will act accordingly. The imposition of 
positive obligations is therefore an option well open to the courts. 
(b) Human Rights Committee 
The HRC has indicated that positive obligations are required for thorough protection of all rights 
– especially horizontal rights such as slavery. The ICCPR's general provision requires states to adopt 
legislation and all other necessary measures to give effect to rights. Failure to protect against rights 
abuse by private actors or to provide effective remedies violates the ICCPR. The duty to protect is 
not limited to the expressly positive articles.144 Positively framed rights merely generate stricter and 
narrower obligations than those that are negatively framed.145 For example, states must protect 
against torture committed by private actors despite being a negatively framed right.146 The ICCPR 
slavery provisions are framed positively and are read by the HRC as requiring prohibition by law.147 
As with the ECHR, states are allocated a large discretion as to the measures required to meet 
those obligations.148 Article 2 suggests generally "judicial, administrative, educative or other 
appropriate measures". Some rights are more specific – requiring prohibition by law.149 The nature 
of a right is the biggest determining factor in what protection measures are required.150 For instance, 
the ICCPR does not provide a right to criminal prosecution of perpetrators. Nonetheless, 
criminalisation is urged in cases of serious violations.151 
New Zealand courts have discussed the comments made by the HRC in William Eduardo 
Delgado Paez v Colombia.152 Colombia argued that it was only obligated to protect the security of a 
person arrested by the state. The HRC disagreed, interpreting the state's obligations widely. Even 
when the state merely knew of a threat they were required to act.153 This illustrates the HRC's 
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stance on states' duty to protect against private violations of rights. States can have some level of 
culpability even when they did not perform the act in question. 
(c) ECtHR jurisprudence 
The ECtHR has found a wide range of positive obligations beyond those expressly stated in the 
ECHR.154 A key case is X and Y v The Netherlands which concerned the right to respect for private 
and family life.155 The objective of that right is to prevent "arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities". However, the Court held that the state must also secure the right in the private sphere. 
How this is to be done depends on the aspect of private life in question.156 This case specifically 
required criminal law because it concerned sexual assault.157 A v The United Kingdom concerned 
the right not to be subjected to torture.158 The failure to convict A's abusive stepfather violated the 
judiciary's obligations to protect A.159 The obligation to protect applied despite the ill-treatment 
being a private act. Here, the effective deterrence standard required criminal provisions.160 The 
ECHR's negatively framed slavery provision also imposes positive obligations. CN v UK is an 
example of this, as is Siliadin where an immigrant to France was held in debt bondage as a domestic 
servant.161 In both cases legislation criminalising conduct commonly occurring alongside servitude 
was insufficient – the specific act of servitude needed criminalising.162 
(d) Other jurisdictions 
(i) United Kingdom 
CN v UK indicated that the United Kingdom's protections regarding slavery were insufficient. 
This section will look at how the United Kingdom has dealt generally with the concept of positive 
obligations. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (HRA) incorporates the ECHR into domestic law. It excludes 
both Houses of Parliament from the scope of public authority. Furthermore, it explicitly states that a 
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failure to introduce a proposal for legislation is not subject to the HRA.163 If legislation cannot be 
interpreted consistently with the ECHR then courts will declare it incompatible but must still give it 
full effect.164 There is reasonable consensus in the United Kingdom that the HRA applies to judicial 
decisions regarding private situations. The dissent arises as to whether courts are obligated to 
develop the common law in a way that implements ECHR rights.165 While there is some horizontal 
application of rights, it is said that there is not full horizontality which would require courts to create 
rights and remedies by developing the common law.166 
In Douglas v Hello! Ltd, the Court of Appeal moved towards protection of privacy although it 
was not made out in this case. The courts' need to have particular regard for freedom of expression 
means it is relevant to private situations as a liberty though not an action itself.167 Courts have 
subsequently provided some protection for privacy through expanding breach of confidence.168 It is 
unclear whether this is an incremental development or the creation of an entirely new cause of 
action.169 However, it does indicate a willingness to protect rights in the private sphere even when 
they are not directly protected in the human rights legislation. 
In Venables v News Groups Newspapers, the High Court granted a worldwide injunction to 
protect the identities of two murderers. This departed significantly from the traditional scope of 
similar injunctions.170 Butler-Sloss J said that judicial actions must be ECHR compliant. Therefore 
the Court was obligated to protect the murderers from threats to their lives and so ordered the 
concealment of their identity.171 This is an example of the judiciary taking action to protect rights in 
the private sphere where the existing legal protections are inadequate.  
(ii) Canada 
Canada has been more reluctant to expand the scope of state responsibility. In Dunmore v 
Ontario, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that the Government had to take positive action 
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to guarantee freedom of association.172 The legislature had protected that right for all other workers 
except farm workers.173 The SCC said that "without the coercion of legislation" private employers 
would almost certainly breach the right.174 The state's inaction was sufficiently linked to the 
violation of the right so it was obligated to improve the legislation.175 However, the SCC said that 
there was no general "constitutional right to protective legislation per se"; it was limited to that 
particular context.176 A more recent decision – Gosselin v Quebec – concerned the provision of 
welfare to citizens. The SCC decided that the right to security did not obligate the state to provide its 
citizens with welfare. They did not rule it out as a possible future development but said the facts of 
this case were an inappropriate basis.177 
(iii) Germany 
In Germany, the values contained in the Basic Law guide the three branches of government's use 
of all areas of law, including private law. This is primarily a result of the Lüth case which concerned 
a violation of freedom of speech by a private individual.178 Judges are bound to adhere to the basic 
rights when applying private law. Furthermore, some basic rights can only be protected through 
state action which the state is thus obligated to take.179 For example, the state is obligated to provide 
citizens with social welfare. In contrast to the Canadian position, the Federal Constitutional Court 
read in positive social rights through the right to human dignity and the principle of the social 
state.180 This sort of wide interpretation of rights could be used as a model for developing 
protections of slavery. 
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(iv) India  
The Constitution of India contains both fundamental rights and directive principles of state 
policy. The fundamental rights are mostly negative rights and are enforceable.181 The directive 
principles are unenforceable and primarily concern social and economic rights.182 However, the 
fundamental rights mean very little if the socioeconomic environment of India remains unchanged. 
Using the directive principles to interpret the fundamental rights widely has resulted in positive 
obligations upon the state.183 For instance, the right to life has been combined with the principle of 
improving public health to obligate the state to provide medical facilities.184 
(e) Further arguments 
The Bill of Rights was specifically drafted to apply only to state and public functions.185 It may 
therefore be contrary to Parliament's original intentions to read in positive obligations. In fact, the 
White Paper explicitly stated that the Bill of Rights does not impose positive obligations on the 
state.186 Furthermore, the implementation of the ICCPR in New Zealand is not exclusively 
dependent upon the Bill of Rights. Thus the existence of positive obligations under ICCPR does not 
necessarily imply the same under the Bill of Rights.187 
There are several practical difficulties with finding positive obligations under the Bill of Rights. 
First, our legal system has multiple sources of law. Determining whether the omission to protect a 
right is a legislative oversight or a gap in the common law can make it difficult to attribute 
responsibility.188 Second, it is unclear whether omissions to regulate can fall within s 3. Omissions 
can constitute acts done but the omission to regulate is of a different nature being so closely tied to 
governmental policies.189 The Bill of Rights must be enforceable by the courts. This becomes 
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difficult if courts are required to pass judgment on government policy decisions.190 That would be 
contrary to the separation of powers. 
Third, bringing human rights rules into areas of private law will introduce greater uncertainty 
and undermine the autonomy of parties.191 The lack of clear-cut and certain definitions in ss 98 and 
98AA is emblematic of the difficulty of transplanting human rights law into domestic criminal law. 
Human rights law applies to the state, aims at protecting society and developing systems, and 
therefore uses expansive interpretations. Criminal law focuses on individual culpability which 
requires precise definitions to provide certainty and predictability.192 Fourthly, positive obligations 
involve an even greater shift of power from Parliament to the judiciary. This was always a concern 
regarding the Bill of Rights, even without positive obligations.193 With positive obligations the 
judiciary would be far more active in remedying legislative omissions and generally making law. 
However, this recent trend of positive obligations is necessary. International expectation is that 
the protection of human rights is prioritised.194 Privatisation has seen many traditional state 
functions delegated to private actors.195 There are also a number of human rights, such as slavery, 
which are primarily violated by private parties, not states.196 Most societies are increasingly state-
regulated such that most private interactions have some public aspect.197 
The long title of the Bill of Rights is similar to the general provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR. 
Interpreting it in light of those treaties thus suggests that it too gives rise to positive obligations. 
Arguably, incorporating rights into a single, constitutional instrument sufficiently promotes human 
rights principles without requiring further obligations.198 However, increasingly it has been realised 
that merely preventing state violations does not adequately protect rights. Individuals are very 
capable of violating human rights. Effective human rights protection therefore involves the 
regulation and education of individuals.199 Jeremy Waldron has explained this as there being waves 
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of duties on the state. The first wave is not to enslave people but the second wave is to educate about 
what constitutes slavery whilst another wave is to remedy situations where slavery is likely to 
occur.200 
Furthermore, many of the traditional dividing lines applied to human rights now primarily create 
shields behind which human rights violations more easily occur. The distinction between active and 
permissive legislation is one such distinction.201 Another is the use of a public-private divide.202 
The threshold for what constitutes public behaviour varies between states. Therefore using that 
distinction to determine what constitutes a human rights violation may result in overly strict 
protection in some states and lacunae in others.203 In addition, rhetoric about positive and negative 
rights is increasingly being replaced with the idea that all rights have a positive element.204 
(f) In summary 
Reading in positive obligations is a key part of modern human rights jurisprudence around the 
world and is accepted by academic commentary. The HRC's conclusive statements about positive 
obligations and the open door left by domestic courts suggest that the Bill of Rights should be read 
as imposing positive obligations on the state actively to protect human rights. Whilst there are 
certainly cogent practical reasons against that, the importance of protecting human rights in today's 
world outweighs them. New Zealand is hence positively obligated to protect against slavery. Yet as 
discussed above the current measures in place do not meet the necessary standard. 
IX A TORT ACTION 
As discussed in Part VII, one response of the courts implicated by Drittwirkung to the 
inadequate legal protection of slavery victims is the development of a tort specifically addressing 
slavery. The need to fill the gap is further supported by the existence of positive obligations. A 
claim in tort is advantageous for the compensation, vindication and deterrence it offers.205 The 
privacy tort was recently created by reading privacy into the Bill of Rights. It is useful in 
consideration of a tort for slavery to look at the creation of this privacy tort. 
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Despite the exclusion of privacy from the Bill of Rights and the previous absence of a tort, it 
was an important common law value.206 Hence the authoritative declaration of a privacy of 
information tort in Hosking was preceded by years of contemplation. Parliament had already 
provided a number of protections for privacy and some argued that the courts should not extend the 
law further.207 However, Tipping J responded that:208 
If Parliament wishes a particular field to be covered entirely by an enactment, and to otherwise be a no-
go area for the Courts, it would need to make the restriction clear. 
Furthermore, Gault P and Blanchard J considered the development of a privacy tort consistent 
with, not precluded by the statutory developments.209 Any common law development regarding 
slavery would need to be consistent with existing statutory measures. In 2012, the High Court also 
introduced a privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion.210 These privacy torts are still relatively new 
and very uncertain. Nonetheless they exemplify the courts' willingness to develop the common law 
in response to the increasing importance of privacy both domestically and internationally. 
Reading in rights requires some level of judicial activism. However, a number of the key 
arguments against the privacy tort do not apply to slavery. In that respect, there is a stronger 
argument for a slavery tort than there was for a privacy tort. Privacy is a relatively wide and 
uncertain legal concept.211 It has only recently developed due to greater concern with rights, 
increased prominence of the value of individuals and modern accessibility of information.212 
Comparatively, slavery is a narrower, older and more certain concept than privacy with more 
universal condemnation. Privacy is absent from the Bill of Rights and its existence significantly 
restricts the right to freedom of expression.213 Slavery is likewise absent. However, protection 
against slavery does not involve direct balancing against any other rights. 
In the United Kingdom, breach of confidence was expanded to include privacy. In contrast to 
this, New Zealand privacy is a newly created, separate tort. It does, however, bear resemblance to 
breach of confidence.214 The courts' experience in dealing with this similar concept and the 
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extensive prior contemplation of a privacy tort perhaps made its introduction an easier step. It is a 
fine line whether this was a development of the common law consistent with the Drittwirkung 
concept or the introduction of a completely new tort to satisfy positive obligations.215 However, the 
New Zealand courts preferred to treat privacy separately from breach of confidence because they 
considered them two distinct concepts.216 This reasoning could be similarly used to support treating 
slavery separately from the torts mentioned in Part IV. 
The development of a tort of slavery would significantly improve the protection offered against 
slavery in New Zealand. The courts would be able to incorporate into it the idea of ownership and 
use the International Labour Organization indicators to effectively identify slavery situations. Given 
the positive obligations to protect against slavery this is an improvement that ought to be made. 
X CONCLUSION 
New Zealand has some legal measures in place to prevent and prosecute slavery. Unfortunately 
these measures do not address the issue at the heart of slavery – ownership of another human being. 
The Bill of Rights can be used to read these provisions widely but even this is not enough to provide 
comprehensive protection.  
Fortunately, the traditional focus of human rights on preventing state action is being 
supplemented with the idea of Drittwirkung and positive obligations. States must actively ensure 
thorough protection against rights violations including those committed by private individuals. In 
CN v UK, the ECtHR imposed these obligations upon the United Kingdom. The narrow framing of 
the existing legislation had left the applicant, a victim of domestic servitude, without remedy. 
Despite the ECHR slavery provision being negatively framed, the United Kingdom was obligated to 
take positive action to prevent and prosecute slavery. 
New Zealand needs to recognise slavery as a high-priority issue. Specific attention needs to be 
directed towards improving the protection offered so that there is no gap through which slavery can 
escape without consequences. The development of a tort action dealing with slavery is something 
that should be considered by the courts. This would provide an action especially designed to combat 
slavery. The application of Drittwirkung and New Zealand's positive obligations necessitate nothing 
less. William Wilberforce's statement ought to be heeded; New Zealand must not look the other 
way.217 
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